From Patronage to Rejection: Ouyang Ge and Chiang Kai-shek’s Naval Personnel Policy

Between Use and Discard: The Ouyang Ge Case and Chiang Kai-shek's Personnel Decisions Regarding the Navy

Sha Qingqing

Abstract: Starting in 1933, the Submarine Mine College, under the command of Nationalist naval general Ouyang Ge, rapidly grew into the most modern naval armed force in the Republic of China within just a few years, thanks to the full support of Chiang Kai-shek himself. However, after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, Chiang swiftly abandoned this loyalist naval force that he had personally nurtured, even dismissing Ouyang Ge from his post, investigating him, and ultimately sentencing him to death. Behind the rise and fall of Ouyang Ge and the Submarine Mine College lay not only the undercurrents of factional struggles within the navy but also the direct influence of changes in Chiang Kai-shek's naval personnel strategy at the time. Analyzing the political considerations behind Chiang Kai-shek's decisions on naval construction and personnel arrangements before and after the War of Resistance through a detailed examination of the Ouyang Ge case, and reconstructing the historical context and behavioral logic of his related decisions, holds certain value.

Keywords: Ouyang Ge, Chiang Kai-shek, Republic of China Navy, Submarine Mine College, Personnel Disposition

At noon on August 20, 1940, the piercing sound of air raid sirens filled the skies over Chongqing. At that moment, Ouyang Ge, the former commandant of the Submarine Mine College of the Ministry of Military Administration, was being escorted to the execution ground. As the execution was about to take place, enemy aircraft launched an attack, and the executioners hastily shot the prisoner by the roadside to complete their duty.① Ouyang Ge, who had held the rank of rear admiral in the navy during his lifetime, thus became the highest-ranking naval officer in the history of the Republic of China's navy to be executed by military law, and the only naval general executed by firing squad during the War of Resistance.②

As early as two years prior, Ouyang Ge had already been dismissed from his post and taken into custody, and the Submarine Mine College he had founded was also disbanded, with its students and troops transferred to other units. Initially, the charges upon his arrest were "inefficiency in combat, delaying military intelligence, and unclear handling of funds." After his execution, the military justice department stated that during the battles at Jiangyin and Madang, Ouyang Ge had repeatedly engaged in behavior such as "disobeying orders in the face of the enemy and making excuses not to advance," and had fabricated documents totaling over 170,000 yuan, which, upon verification, led to his disposition under military law.③

*In the process of collecting historical materials, I am deeply grateful for the substantial assistance provided by Zhang Li of the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica in Taipei, and Zhao Zheng of the Department of History at Fudan University.

① Dong Yanming, "The Death of Ouyang Ge," in Chongqing Municipal Institute of Culture and History (ed.), Records of the Old Land of Bayu, Vol. 4, Zhonghua Book Company, 2005, pp. 53–54; Xie Yanchi, "The Flesh-and-Blood Great Wall of the Naval Submarine Mine College: Historical Facts of Teachers and Students Fighting the War Before and After the War of Resistance," Chinese and Foreign Magazine (Taipei), No. 4, 2007, pp. 47–61.

② Ouyang Ge, courtesy name Jiuyuan, was a native of Yihuang, Jiangxi, and the son of the renowned Buddhist scholar Ouyang Jingwu. He graduated from the Yantai Naval School in 1916 and followed Sun Yat-sen south during the Constitutional Protection Movement. In 1922, while serving as captain of the gunboat Yuzhang, he escorted the gunboat Yongfeng, on which Sun Yat-sen was traveling, and met Chiang Kai-shek. He subsequently served as vice principal of the Whampoa Naval School. During the "Zhongshan Warship Incident" in 1926, he participated in the arrest and interrogation of Li Zhilong and was considered one of the main planners, which also led to his detention. He was released after the "April 12 Incident" and was immediately sent to Europe to study military affairs, returning to China at the end of 1931.

③ "Execution of Ouyang Ge," Ta Kung Pao (Chongqing), September 1, 1940, p. 2; "Execution of Ouyang Ge Carried Out," Shen Pao, September 1, 1940, p. 2.

However, since Ouyang Ge's death, discussions about the case and calls for his rehabilitation have never ceased. Those who objected to this disposition mainly argued that there was no solid evidence for Ouyang Ge's charges, and that numerous doubts surrounded both his dismissal and imprisonment and his eventual execution. Decades later, Chen Lifu, who had been very close to him, recalled the case and insisted, "His flaw was arrogance due to his talent, but it doesn't seem like he was corrupt."① The full course of events, the detailed handling process, and the attitudes of the main parties involved have never been truly clarified. When scholars on both sides of the strait discuss personnel punishments during the War of Resistance and the development of the Chinese navy, they have never conducted a comprehensive study of the entire course of the Ouyang Ge case.②

Previous studies on the Chinese navy before and after the War of Resistance mostly attribute the Ouyang Ge case directly to factional disputes within the navy.③ Immediately after the end of the War of Resistance, public opinion pointed out that "Ouyang Ge thought too highly of himself, offending many senior officers of the old faction," leading to his being framed by other naval factions.④ However, if the direct cause of Ouyang Ge's death is attributed solely to the vicious struggles between naval factions before and after the War of Resistance, it is easy to overlook another important aspect—Ouyang Ge was not only an important naval general but also a loyalist deeply valued by Chiang Kai-shek; why could he not escape this fate?

In fact, without Chiang Kai-shek's strong support, Ouyang Ge could never have risen rapidly among the various naval factions and subsequently expanded into the so-called "Revolutionary New Navy" on the eve of the War of Resistance.⑤ After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, it was precisely due to the change in Chiang Kai-shek's attitude that the Submarine Mine College, led by Ouyang Ge, gradually shrank in scale after 1938 until it was finally disbanded, and Ouyang Ge himself ended up being executed under military law. Whether it was the arrest of Ouyang Ge in June 1938 or his execution in August 1940, the relevant orders were issued personally by Chiang Kai-shek.

Between using and discarding Ouyang Ge, how did Chiang Kai-shek view naval construction before and after the War of Resistance? What reasons prompted him to withdraw his support for his loyalist Ouyang Ge and the Submarine Mine College? What truly caused Ouyang Ge's death? Through the study of these questions, can we gain insight into Chiang Kai-shek's naval personnel strategy before and after the War of Resistance? Or can we compare this with Chiang Kai-shek's philosophy of employing people at the time to reach a more comprehensive conclusion?

This study hopes to re-examine Chiang Kai-shek's naval personnel strategy before and after the War of Resistance by reviewing archives held by the National Archives of Taiwan and the Ministry of National Defense, Chiang Kai-shek's Diary, and recollections of graduates of the Submarine Mine College, and on this basis answer the aforementioned questions.⑥ At the same time, it also hopes to carefully scrutinize Chiang Kai-shek's behavioral characteristics and logic when dealing with similar issues.⑦

I. The Background of Ouyang Ge's Rise to Prominence

The modern Chinese navy began in the late Qing Dynasty. By the eve of the Northern Expedition, it was primarily divided into three major factions: the Central Navy, dominated by Fujianese and subordinate to the Beiyang government; the Northeast Navy under Zhang Zuolin (later known as the Qingdao faction); and the Guangdong Navy under the Guangdong government (later known as the Whampoa faction). After the Northern Expedition, Yang Shuzhuang and Chen Shaokuan, leaders of the Fujian faction of the navy, switched their allegiance to support the National Revolutionary Army, thereby preserving the status of the Central Navy. However, Chiang Kai-shek never trusted this Fujian faction navy, which had been inherited from the "previous dynasty," and once abolished the Navy Ministry, transforming it into the Naval Administration subordinate to the Ministry of Military Administration. It was not until June 1929, when the Central Navy contributed to the campaign against the Guangxi clique, that the Navy Ministry was restored.

① Chen Lifu, Mirror of Success and Failure: Memoirs of Chen Lifu, Taipei, Cheng Chung Book Company, 1994, p. 55.

② On the mainland, only Liu Xiaoning's "Unsolved Cases of the Republic of China Navy: The Death of Ouyang Ge" (Essence of Literature and History, No. 5, 2000, pp. 26–27) briefly introduced the course of Ouyang Ge's management of the Submarine Mine College, but the author also expressed that the sudden dismissal and execution during the War of Resistance were "puzzling." On the Taiwan side, although there has been little exploration of this case, Zhang Li briefly introduced the Ouyang Ge case in certain paragraphs of "From 'Four Seas' to 'One Family': The National Government's Re-attempt to Unify the Navy, 1939–1948" (Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taipei), No. 4, 1996, pp. 267–316).

③ Among existing studies, those providing relatively detailed descriptions of the struggle between Ouyang Ge and the Fujian clique of the navy include Gao Xiaoxing and Shi Ping's The Rise and Fall of the Republican Navy (China Literature and History Press, 1989 edition), and Zhong Hua's "A Discussion on the Construction of the National Government's Navy between 1931 and 1937" (Journal of Nanjing Institute of Political Science, Issue 5, 2004, pp. 56–58). Han Zhen's "Factions in the Republican Navy and Their Formation" (Military History Research, Issue 1, 1992, pp. 63–68) also mentions this.

④ Reporter Jian: "The Death of Our Country's Naval Expert Ouyang Ge," Starlight, Issue 6, 1946, p. 6.

⑤ Shi Quansheng (ed.): History of Modern Chinese Military Education, Southeast University Press, 1996 edition, p. 277.

⑥ In recent years, numerous academic studies have addressed the issue of Chiang Kai-shek's personnel appointments. For example, Yuan Chengyi's "Chiang Kai-shek and Zhejiang within Geographical Ties—An Examination of the Period Around the Establishment of the Nanjing National Government," Historical Review, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 109–117; Wang Qisheng's "From Orphans and Widows to the Lonely Ruler—Chiang Kai-shek's Early Growth Experience and Personality Traits," Journal of Nanjing University, Issue 5, 2010, pp. 83–93; Shen Xiaoyun's "Perspectives on the Transformation of Diplomatic Personnel Appointment Methods under Chiang Kai-shek's 'Leader-Centric' System," Journal of Zhejiang University, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 1–13; and Deng Ye's "Chiang Kai-shek's Adjudication of the Case of Fang Xianjue's Defection to the Enemy," Historical Research, Issue 5, 2006, pp. 136–148.

⑦ The issue of how Chiang Kai-shek handled and coordinated factions within the Kuomintang has always been a focal point of academic attention. Recent noteworthy achievements include Xiao Ruping's "The Loss of Trust: Chen Mingshu and Chiang Kai-shek Before and After the January 28 Incident," Republican Archives, Issue 2, 2012, pp. 109–113; Huang Daoxuan's "The CCP, the Guangdong Clique, and Chiang Kai-shek: The Game of Autumn 1934," Modern Chinese History Studies, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 4–15; and Jin Yilin's "Chiang Kai-shek's Second Resignation and Return to Power," Historical Research, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 23–40.

On August 16, 1928, at the launching ceremony of the gunboat Xianning, Chiang Kai-shek made a bold declaration: "We expect that in ten years, we will have a navy of 600,000 tons, making us a first-class naval power in the world."① However, Chiang adopted a perfunctory attitude toward both the Central Navy's requests for purchasing and building ships and its needs for daily operational funds. As for the Northeast Navy and the Guangdong Navy, although nominally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, they both belonged to local factions and had long been operating independently.② In addition to Chiang Kai-shek himself having no intention of supporting the development and expansion of the old navy represented by the Central Navy, many key figures within the Kuomintang were also dissatisfied with the Fujian clique's monopoly over the Central Navy. When the January 28 Incident broke out in 1932, public opinion widely criticized the Central Navy for its passive avoidance of combat.③ Ding Mucun, Gao Youtang, and others, who were then members of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government, proposed the "Proposal for the Thorough Reconstruction of the Navy" at the National Crisis Conference in Luoyang, advocating for the abolition of the Ministry of the Navy. Chiang maintained a tacitly approving attitude toward such words and actions, using the public opinion environment to further weaken the Fujian clique's control over the national naval system. In September 1932, the "Proposal for Naval Unification" previously submitted by Chen Shaokuan, then Minister of the Navy, was rejected by him.④

At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek began to contemplate building a brand-new armed force on the water. He had long realized that "if we wish to succeed in the future, we must start from scratch and resolve the issue fundamentally; otherwise, we cannot speak of revolution."⑤ Regarding the navy, he hoped to establish a loyalist navy that would be completely obedient to him, outside of the existing old factions. In November 1932, Chiang instructed He Yingqin to prepare for the establishment of a new navy and to identify suitable candidates for leadership. Against this backdrop, Ouyang Ge, who had lost power after the "Zhongshan Warship Incident," once again came into his view and was subsequently entrusted with important responsibilities.

On March 27, 1933, the Submarine Mine College was established at Ganlu Temple in Zhenjiang, with Ouyang Ge serving as its principal. This school was the "loyalist navy" that Chiang Kai-shek had built from scratch. The inauguration ceremony was held with high protocol, attended by Lin Xianyang (representing Chiang Kai-shek), Gu Zhutong (representing the National Government), and He Yaozu (Vice Chief of the General Staff).⑥ Initially under the Ministry of Military Administration, the school publicly claimed it was not a naval institution but purely an Army Submarine Mine College for underwater offense and defense. Although nominally an Army unit, all its educational systems and curricula were naval in nature, aiming to cultivate naval talent. Most of the school's instructors came from the former Whampoa Naval School, the Qingdao Naval School, and personnel who had been marginalized within the Ministry of the Navy, while the commanding officers were all drawn from the Central Training Corps. From the composition of the officer personnel, it can also be seen that the school deliberately gathered non-Fujian naval personnel. When recruiting students, it specifically stipulated that no individuals from Fujian province would be admitted.⑦ By the time the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out, the school had recruited four cohorts of students and trainees, a number far exceeding that of other naval schools, and had also mobilized students from other military academies to transfer and take entrance exams.⑧ Before the war, the school had also sent large numbers of students to study in Britain and Germany.⑨ Subsequently, most graduates served in or taught at the fast boat squadrons under the Submarine Mine College, with almost none joining the direct units of the Central Navy.⑩

① "Record of the Launching of the Warship Xianning," Naval Journal, Volume 1, Issue 4, 1928, p. 12.

② For related research, see Ma Youhuan's "Foreign-Purchased Warships That Failed to Arrive in China During the War of Resistance," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taipei), Issue 4, 1996, pp. 319–338.

③ Li Shijia: "The Navy in the January 28 Incident," in Yang Zhiben (ed.), Historical Materials on the Navy of the Republic of China, Ocean Press, 1987 edition, p. 971. See also Ma Junjie's "The Chinese Navy in the January 28 Incident," Studies on the War of Resistance Against Japan, Issue 1, 2003, pp. 47–61.

④ In his proposal, Chen Shaokuan formally requested that the warships under the Northeast and Guangdong navies be officially brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy. He suggested that Shen Honglie, the head of the Northeast Navy, should serve exclusively as the Mayor of Qingdao, and that Chen Ce, who controlled the Guangdong Navy, should prioritize provincial affairs in Guangdong, or that both men should be transferred to central military and political organs. After the proposal was rejected, Chen Shaokuan again submitted his resignation in protest, but was retained by Wang Jingwei, the President of the Executive Yuan.

⑤ Chiang Kai-shek's Diary (manuscript), January 18, 1931, Archives of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The same applies hereinafter.

⑥ "Establishment of the National Submarine Mine College," New Electrical World, Issue 7, 1933, pp. 17–18.

⑦ Zhang Li: Oral History of Mr. Li Yuxi, Taipei, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1991 edition, p. 18. See also "Shanghai Municipal Social Bureau's Submission of the List of Fourth-Cohort Students from the Submarine Mine College" (October 1937), Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai Municipal Social Bureau Archives, Q6—18—411.

⑧ "Telegram from Ouyang Ge to Chiang Kai-shek Urging Zhang Zhizhong to Quickly Send Eighth-Cohort Students from the Military Academy to Take the Submarine Mine College Exam" (May 6, 1933), Taipei, Academia Historica, Chiang Kai-shek Presidential Artifacts Archive, 002/080200/084/028.

⑨ Bao Zunpeng: History of the Chinese Navy, Taipei, Commercial Press, 1970 edition, pp. 835–836.

⑩ "Telegram from Ouyang Ge et al. to Chiang Kai-shek Regarding the Proposed Assignment Methods for Graduates of the Submarine Mine College, etc." (October 23, 1934), Taipei, Academia Historica, Chiang Kai-shek Presidential Artifacts Archive, 002/080200/442/193.

The term "electric mines" referred to electrically released torpedoes and mines, tasks generally undertaken by smaller torpedo boats and minelayers. The school's primary objective was to cultivate a force of small surface vessels. Ouyang Ge once pointed out: Given China's national conditions, with its relatively backward industry, developing a navy to compete with enemies using such backward industry was difficult to achieve in terms of both economics and time. Therefore, developing fast boats to check the enemy's navy was relatively easier.① In a 1933 report to Chiang Kai-shek, German advisors similarly emphasized that the Submarine Mine College should play a leading role in river defense operations, rather than the so-called Central Navy.② From this, it can be seen that the Submarine Mine College was not merely a military academy but also a waterborne combat unit, with ample funding and military resources. Since its founding, the Electric Mine Battalion had been placed under its command. Over the following years, the patrol boat "Jinghai" from the Zhejiang Offshore Police Bureau was transferred for its use, along with the purchase of the barge "Zhenhai," the training ship "Free China," and several motorboats. Additionally, the Submarine Mine College successively received a batch of new and old vessels from various locations, such as the "Tongxin," "Tongde," and "Cedian." At the same time, it spent heavily to order advanced torpedo boats, fast boat tenders, and minelayers from Britain and Germany, and purchased mines and other weapons from Italy.③ While introducing foreign equipment, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to Ouyang Ge's successive hiring of German and Italian instructors, and invited foreign advisors to serve as the school's engineering and technical personnel.

In May 1936, the Submarine Mine College relocated to Huangtian Port in Jiangyin and was officially named the "Ministry of Military Affairs Submarine Mine College." Chiang Kai-shek personally assumed the role of president, while Ouyang Ge served as the director of education, responsible for actual operations. The Submarine Mine College was the only naval academy where Chiang Kai-shek personally served as president. In October 1936, he personally visited the school to inspect it and delivered a speech, a treatment not afforded to other naval units.④ Thereafter, with Chiang Kai-shek's support, the school further expanded its establishment, with "all various newly added equipment being realized in sequence one after another, and the number of personnel and materials gradually increasing."⑤ The school headquarters was reorganized into an Office and five groups: Academic Affairs, Discipline, Military Affairs, Ship Administration, and Quartermaster. Under these were established the Student Battalion, the Student Soldier Corps, the Fast Boat Battalion, the Electric Mine Battalion, the Factory, and the Hospital, with a total number of officers and soldiers exceeding 7,000.⑥ In addition to its large personnel count, the Submarine Mine College possessed the largest and most advanced fast boat force in the country at the time, composed of four squadrons, with 15 British and German-made torpedo boats and approximately 20 other supporting vessels. By the time the War of Resistance against Japan broke out, the Submarine Mine College under Ouyang Ge's command had effectively become a "small navy" on the Yangtze River.

After years of development, Ouyang Ge increasingly identified himself as a direct disciple of Chiang Kai-shek, while regarding the Submarine Mine College as the "Whampoa Military Academy of the Navy." He aspired to replace the Fujian clique's navy, with his intention to surpass other naval factions being obvious. As early as 1934, upon his suggestion, Chiang Kai-shek once considered merging the Torpedo School under the Navy Ministry into the Submarine Mine College, but this was abandoned due to Chen Shaokuan's firm opposition.⑦ Subsequently, Ouyang Ge repeatedly proposed that "a new revolutionary navy must be established" and that "the Submarine Mine College is the birthplace of the new navy."⑧ In his own words: "After being defeated by Japan in the Jiawu War, we have been unable to recover until now. Although we have the name of a navy, in reality, it is equal to zero!"⑨ The implication was that the old navy could almost be ignored, and the "new navy" was naturally the Submarine Mine College.

II. The Course of the Ouyang Ge Case

With the outbreak of the July 7 Incident, the War of Resistance against Japan erupted fully. On July 30, 1937, the Military Committee officially appointed Ouyang Ge, Director of Education of the Submarine Mine College, to concurrently serve as the Commander of the Jiangyin District River Defense, actually responsible for the Yangtze River defenses from Nanjing to the Shanghai area. On August 13, the Battle of Shanghai began. Two days later, the Military Committee established the Yangtze River Defense Command, with its personnel concurrently held by staff from the Submarine Mine College.① Eager to achieve merit, Ouyang Ge was naturally keen to try, proactively proposing to Chiang Kai-shek that the Submarine Mine College's Fast Boat Battalion launch a surprise attack on the Japanese fleet. This was the Submarine Mine College's first combat engagement. After days of planning, Ouyang Ge decided to dispatch two torpedo boats to launch a night raid from Jiangyin, traveling up the Huangpu River to attack the Japanese fleet flagship "Izumo," which was anchored in the Huangpu River. However, on the night of August 16, only one fast boat reached its battle position, forcing it to launch the attack alone. The next day, although media reported that "the Izumo was severely damaged, with widespread rumors that it had sunk,"② the torpedoes fired by the Chinese side did not actually hit the target, ultimately striking only the riverbank embankment.③ On August 20, He Yingqin sent a secret telegram to Ouyang Ge: "Although success was not achieved, the arrogance of the enemy ships has been reduced. We hope you will continue to make efforts... to achieve complete success."④

① Wang Xianqiang and Du Longji, "Recollections of the Submarine Mine College," in Committee of Cultural and Historical Materials of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (ed.), Selected Drafts of Cultural and Historical Materials, "War of Resistance Against Japan" (Vol. 1), China Cultural and Historical Press, 2002, pp. 671–674.

② "Two Proposals by Fassauer to Chiang Kai-shek on the Development and Reorganization of the Chinese Army" (February–May 1933), in Second Historical Archives of China (ed.), Secret Archives of Sino-German Diplomacy (1927–1947), Guangxi Normal University Press, 1994, p. 137.

③ "Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Ouyang Ge Regarding Negotiations with H.H. Kung for the Change to Purchasing Italian Mines" (July 27, 1934), Archives of the President Chiang Kai-shek, Academia Historica, Taipei, File No. 002/010200/116/067.

④ "Chiang Kai-shek's Inspection of the Submarine Mine College in Zhenjiang and Address to Students, etc." (October 9, 1936), Archives of the President Chiang Kai-shek, Academia Historica, Taipei, File No. 002/06010000/118/009; Xu Yuzhi, "The Submarine Mine College as I Knew It," Zhenjiang Cultural and Historical Materials, Vol. 17, compiled and printed by the Committee of Cultural and Historical Materials of the Zhenjiang Municipal Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 1990, pp. 6–9.

⑤ "Brief History of the Submarine Mine College," Huisheng Monthly Report, No. 1, 1937, pp. 193–195.

⑥ Bao Zunpeng, History of the Chinese Navy, p. 840.

⑦ "Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Inviting Ouyang Ge to Nanchang for a Meeting and Discussing the Merger of the Submarine Mine Colleges with Chen Shaokuan" (February 24, 1934), Archives of the President Chiang Kai-shek, Academia Historica, Taipei, File No. 002/010200/106/016.

⑧ Li Fu'an, "Historical Materials on the Submarine Mine College," in Wu Jiezhang et al. (eds.), History of the Modern Chinese Navy, People's Liberation Army Press, 1989, p. 361.

⑨ Ouyang Ge, World Naval Armaments, Zhengzhong Book Bureau, 1936, p. 1.

Although the initial battle was not a success, Chiang Kai-shek's support for the Submarine Mine College continued for some time. He used his influence to satisfy Ouyang Ge's various requests as much as possible, hoping that merit would eventually be achieved. At the end of August, the Farmers Bank of China rejected the Submarine Mine College's request for a 4 million yuan loan for purchasing boats, citing that "the Submarine Mine College's borrowings are too large, and our bank is already strained in meeting obligations to various parties."⑤ Upon learning of this, Chiang Kai-shek personally telegraphed the Farmers Bank, stating that "the matter is extremely urgent" and instructing that "in addition to approving the request, please proceed accordingly." The Farmers Bank ultimately had to release the full amount.⑥ At the time, there were already comments in society stating that "the school's scale is vast and its funding is ample, second only to the Air Force."⑦

In September and October, the Central Navy suffered repeated heavy blows from the Japanese forces, with major warships such as the Ninghai, Pinghai, and Jiankang being sunk one after another.⑧ In contrast, the speedboat battalion of the Submarine Mine College, concealed in the anti-aircraft stone caves at Huangtian Port, suffered relatively minor losses. Consequently, Chiang Kai-shek once hoped that Ouyang Ge would command the speedboats to secretly search for "enemy spies and secret radio installations."⑨ However, in order to preserve his strength, Ouyang Ge dispersed the various torpedo speedboat squadrons to hide in small ports upstream and downstream of Jiangyin.⑩ During this period, although speedboats were dispatched to launch surprise attacks on Japanese warships, no combat results were achieved; precious speedboats were sunk, and numerous officers and soldiers were killed or wounded.①

Furthermore, another important task of the Submarine Mine College was to lay mines along the Jiangyin line to block Japanese warships, in accordance with instructions from the Military Affairs Commission, but the results were equally unimpressive. In fact, as early as 1935, Chiang Kai-shek had ordered Ouyang Ge to investigate and design locations for mine blockade downstream of Nanjing and to draft wartime contingency plans. However, in actual mine-laying operations, the Submarine Mine College under Ouyang Ge's command was plagued by constant errors. For instance, at the end of September, the North China Daily News reported that Chinese mines, unsecured and drifting freely, had been discovered in the waterways near Shanghai, seriously threatening the normal navigation of vessels from various countries.① The relevant reports attracted high attention from public opinion both at home and abroad, and many countries lodged protests with the Nanjing government on this account. Chiang Kai-shek also severely reprimanded Ouyang Ge. Although Ouyang Ge later defended himself by stating: "Because the river was deep and the mine-laying ship was bombed and sunk, making mine-laying impossible, and upon investigation, all were found to be sunken mines, with no drifting mines as reported by the North China Daily News."②

① Case on the Organization of the Jiangyin District River Defense Command, held by the "Ministry of National Defense," Taipei, National Army Archives, 581.4/3111.3.

② "Enemy Warship Izumo Hit by Torpedo, Reported to Have Sunk Last Night," Central Daily News (Nanjing), August 17, 1937, p. 4; "Warship Izumo Seriously Damaged and Under Repair in the Huangpu River," Central Daily News (Nanjing), August 18, 1937, p. 3.

③ JACAR (Asia Historical Materials Center) Ref. C11084183100, "August 16, Showa 12," "Log of the Light Cruiser Izumo July 20–August 19, Showa 12 (National Institute for Defense Studies)." The claim that the torpedo hit the Izumo has been inherited and retained in Chinese narratives on both sides of the strait. For example, in the official history from the Taiwan side, History of the National Revolutionary War, Part Three: Resisting Japan and Defending Against Humiliation, Volume Four (Taipei: Li-Ming Cultural Enterprise Company, 1978 edition, p. 90), it is written: "On the night of the sixteenth, a surprise attack was launched on the enemy warship Izumo, inflicting severe damage."

④ Secret Telegram from He Yingqin to Ouyang Ge (August 20, 1937), edited by the Second Historical Archives of China: The Frontal Battlefield of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 2005 edition, p. 343.

⑤ Telegram from the Head Office of the China Farmers Bank to the Nanjing Branch Politely Declining the Loan Request from the Submarine Mine College (August 20, 1937), edited by the Financial Research Institute of the People's Bank of China: Materials on the History of the Republic of China: The China Farmers Bank, China Economic Publishing House, 1980 edition, pp. 73–74.

⑥ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Ordering the China Farmers Bank to Grant a Loan of Four Million Yuan to the Submarine Mine College (September 14, 1937), edited by the Financial Research Institute of the People's Bank of China: Materials on the History of the Republic of China: The China Farmers Bank, p. 74.

⑦ Guo Yanling: "Lament for Ouyang Ge," Xinli (New Force), Issue 5, 1940, p. 11.

⑧ For the specific process of the Battle of Jiangyin, see Zhang Qian, Night Tales of Warships, Qingdao Publishing House, 2012 edition, pp. 145–196.

⑨ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Instructing Ouyang Ge to Dispatch Personnel to Reconnoiter the Towns and Villages on the Opposite Bank of Jiangyin (October 4, 1937), held by the "National Archives," Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/010300/006/011.

⑩ Telegram from Ouyang Ge to Chiang Kai-shek Reporting That 23 Japanese Aircraft Continued to Bombard Chengjiang This Morning, etc. (September 25, 1937), held by the "National Archives," Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/090200/032/288.

Telegram from Ouyang Ge to Chiang Kai-shek Reporting the Course of Events Regarding the Order to Dispatch Ma Buxiang to Lead Speedboats to Attack Enemy Warships at Jinji Port, etc. (October 16, 1937), held by the "National Archives," Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/090200/034/128.

② Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Instructing Ouyang Ge to Negotiate with H.H. Kung Regarding the Change from Previously Approved German Mines to Italian Mines (July 27, 1934), held by the "National Archives," Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/010200/116/067; Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Ouyang Ge Regarding the Installation of Mine Blockade Zones (January 14, 1935), held by the "National Archives," Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/070100/040/082; Telegram from Ouyang Ge to Chiang Kai-shek Reporting That the 120 Semi-Submerged Special Mines Previously Submitted Have Been Successfully Negotiated (October 13, 1935), held by the "National Archives," Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/255/100.

Chiang Kai-shek, however, grew increasingly impatient with Ouyang Ge's performance. Ouyang Ge naturally also perceived Chiang Kai-shek's various dissatisfactions. He had instructed the speedboat battalion to dispatch two torpedo speedboats every night to patrol in search of combat opportunities, even writing in the orders: "We must sink one or two enemy warships, otherwise we will surely be criticized by public opinion."③ When the War of Resistance broke out, public opinion at home and abroad generally believed that "Ouyang Ge was a veteran naval officer, and everyone had high hopes for the Submarine Mine College, thinking that China's new navy would emerge from it."④ However, until the fall of Nanjing, the Submarine Mine College had not achieved any combat results. In late December, Ouyang Ge was forced to lead the Submarine Mine College troops to withdraw to the Hukou-Jiujiang line to await orders.⑤

At this point, Chiang Kai-shek's dissatisfaction with Ouyang Ge had turned into disappointment, and he questioned whether the Submarine Mine College still needed to exist. On January 29, 1938, he instructed He Yingqin that "funds allocated to the Submarine Mine College and Ouyang Ge's faction should be reduced as much as possible," even considering its formal dissolution.⑥ He Yingqin suggested temporarily retaining the Submarine Mine College on the premise of reducing its establishment, and further proposed splitting the Submarine Mine College into two parts: combat units such as the speedboats would be placed under the command and dispatch of the Central Navy, while the original school administration departments would continue to be managed by the Ministry of Military Administration.⑦ Under these circumstances, Ouyang Ge immediately expressed to Chiang Kai-shek his hope for an opportunity to preserve the Submarine Mine College "to demonstrate future effectiveness."⑧ After consideration, Chiang Kai-shek approved the temporary retention of the Submarine Mine College. On March 4, the Ministry of Military Administration ordered that the affiliated factory of the Submarine Mine College be placed under its direct jurisdiction, and all personnel except the Student Corps were temporarily managed by the Gendarmerie Command, with the establishment reduced from 6,502 to 3,809 personnel.⑨ Despite this, Chiang Kai-shek still made preparations for the eventual complete abolition of the Submarine Mine College. In mid-April, under his direction, the Ministry of Military Administration began to organize a Liquidation Committee for the Submarine Mine College, but due to the tight defense situation in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River at the time, the unit was temporarily retained. However, the defeat in the Battle of Madang Fortress ultimately prompted Chiang Kai-shek to firmly resolve to abandon Ouyang Ge.

As a vital gateway to Wuhan, the Nationalist government meticulously constructed a Yangtze River blockade defense line around the Madang Fortress. The Submarine Mine College served as a waterborne armed force in support, primarily responsible for laying mines. On June 17, the Japanese vanguard arrived, marking the beginning of the Battle of Madang. During the fierce fighting, the Japanese fleet successfully breached the minefield and transported large numbers of reinforcements via the waterway to land, subsequently launching repeated artillery bombardments against the Changshan positions held by Nationalist troops to support the Japanese land offensive. On June 26, the Madang Fortress finally fell. This battle was a major setback for the Chinese side in the early stages of the Battle of Wuhan. Chiang Kai-shek lamented: "With Madang lost, the gateway is wide open."⑩ An enraged Chiang Kai-shek even ordered: "All officers and soldiers retreating from Madang, regardless of their unit, shall be disarmed and escorted."① The day after Madang fell, Ouyang Ge was dismissed and arrested on charges of "delaying military intelligence, poor combat performance, and unclear handling of funds," and the dissolution of the Submarine Mine College was announced effective immediately.① It is noteworthy that the order to arrest Ouyang Ge was issued directly by Chiang himself via handwritten directive. Bai Chongxi explicitly informed Xu Yongchang regarding this matter: "...Ouyang Ge is unusable; Mr. Chiang has issued a handwritten order for his arrest and handover to military law enforcement for processing."②

①“A Floating Mine Discovered?" , The North China Herald, 29 September 1937, p. 487.

② "Telegram from Ouyang Ge to the Military Affairs Commission Reporting on Mine-Laying Operations of the Submarine Mine College" (October 3, 1937), held at the "National Archives" in Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/090200/034/229.

③ Xie Yanchi: "Torpedo Boats in the Battle of Nanjing," compiled by the Research Committee for Cultural and Historical Materials of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, The Battle of Nanjing: Firsthand Accounts of the War of Resistance by Former Nationalist Generals, China Cultural and Historical Publishing House, 1987 edition, p. 66.

④ Guo Yanling: "Lament for Ouyang Ge," Xinli (New Power), Issue 5, 1940, p. 11.

⑤ During this period, the Ministry of Military Affairs once ordered the Submarine Mine College to take over naval vessels moored near Yueyang under the name of the River Defense Command, but this was abandoned for various reasons. However, this move indicates that until this point, the Ministry of Military Affairs still regarded the Submarine Mine College as a trusted central faction unit. See Wang Xianqiang and Du Longji, "Recollections of the Submarine Mine College," compiled by the Committee for Cultural and Historical Materials of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Selected Drafts of Cultural and Historical Materials, "War of Resistance Against Japan" (Vol. 1), p. 673.

⑥ "Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to He Yingqin Instructing Reduction of Expenses, Personnel, and Weapons of the Submarine Mine College and Ouyang Ge, and Transfer to Naval Control" (January 29, 1938), held at the "National Archives" in Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/010300/008/073.

⑦ "Memorial from He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek Requesting Temporary Retention of the Submarine Mine College and Proposing Measures for Reducing Its Establishment, Cutting Expenses, and Dissolving the River Defense Command" (February 17, 1938), held at the "National Archives" in Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/281/062.

⑧ "Memorial from Ouyang Ge to Chiang Kai-shek Regarding Opinions on Reducing the Establishment, Cutting Expenses, School Site and Stationing, and Reassignment of Duties for the Submarine Mine College" (February 17, 1938), held at the "National Archives" in Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/281/063.

⑨ "Case of Reorganization of the Submarine Mine College," held at the "Ministry of National Defense" in Taipei, National Army Archives, 582.3/1071.2.

① Diary of Chiang Kai-shek (manuscript), July 2, 1938.

① Diary of Chiang Kai-shek (manuscript), June 30, 1938.

After Ouyang Ge's arrest, the military tribunal trial dragged on without a conclusion, and Ouyang Ge himself remained under house arrest for a long period. Without any announcement of Ouyang Ge's "charges" or "dismissal," the outside world was unaware of his true situation. For instance, the intelligence department of the Japanese Ministry of the Army still listed Ouyang Ge as one of the key military and political cadres on the Chongqing side in 1939.③ After two years in custody, news emerged on August 15, 1940, that a final ruling had sentenced Ouyang Ge to death.④ Just five days later, the death sentence was carried out. When the immediate execution was announced on August 20, Ouyang Ge himself was completely unprepared, and upon learning that "by order of the Chairman, I am to be executed," he felt it was "truly unexpected."⑤

In fact, at the beginning of Ouyang Ge's dismissal, most key military and political figures within the Kuomintang did not anticipate that he would ultimately face the death penalty. This assumption stemmed primarily from the precedent of Chiang Kai-shek personally ordering Ouyang Ge's detention in the past, followed by his subsequent reinstatement. In March 1926, the "Zhongshan Warship Incident" erupted. Less than half a month after being appointed fleet commander by Chiang Kai-shek, Ouyang Ge was arrested on April 1. Chiang wrote in his diary: "...Ouyang Ge, the fleet commander, has been detained because Ouyang allied with the right wing, which is detrimental to the Party."⑥ However, since the actions of Ouyang Ge and others tacitly aligned with Chiang Kai-shek's political needs at the time, "the arrest of Ouyang Ge was actually a form of 'protective custody.'"⑦ After the "April 12 Incident," Ouyang Ge was released and subsequently sent to Europe to inspect navies. Upon his return in 1931, he was entrusted with the important task of building Chiang Kai-shek's central naval force.

So, what were the true reasons that led to Ouyang Ge's dismissal and abandonment during the War of Resistance, followed by a sudden turn leading to his execution?

III. Ouyang Ge in Chiang Kai-shek's Eyes

To investigate the origins of Chiang Kai-shek's handling of the Ouyang Ge case, one must first examine Chiang's long-standing impressions of him and his related personnel management strategies. Although Chiang Kai-shek had high hopes for the "new navy" built by Ouyang Ge, he always harbored considerable doubts and even dissatisfaction regarding Ouyang Ge's personal character and conduct. The reasons he continued to support him wholeheartedly before and during the early stages of the War of Resistance were, on the one hand, the political necessity of balancing naval factions, and on the other, reliance on his expertise in naval affairs.

Since the establishment of the Submarine Mine College in 1933, Ouyang Ge had been a central faction general whom Chiang Kai-shek cultivated as a priority in the navy. Chiang's willingness to entrust the heavy responsibility of building a central navy to Ouyang Ge may have been based on the following considerations: First, Ouyang Ge had followed Sun Yat-sen since the Constitutional Protection Movement, making him a veteran within the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek had become acquainted with him during the defense of the Yongfeng warship and was familiar with his background and experience, considering him politically reliable.⑧ Second, Ouyang Ge graduated from the Yantai Naval Academy, being one of the few naval specialists within the Kuomintang, and was familiar with European military developments. Third, he had no ties with the Min (Fujian) faction navy, and indeed had accumulated grievances with them. For example, upon his return in 1931, the Ministry of the Navy once refused to re-grant him his military rank. Therefore, in the competition with the central navy, Ouyang Ge was bound to go all out.

① "Report on the Liquidation of the Submarine Mine College," held at the "Ministry of National Defense" in Taipei, National Army Archives, 109/3512.

② Xu Yongchang: Diary of Xu Yongchang, Vol. 4, Taipei, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990 edition, p. 333.

③ JACAR (Asian Historical Materials Center) Ref. C11110749600, "Organizational System and Name List of the Kuomintang in Chongqing, Showa 14 (1939)" (National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense).

④ "Letter from Wu Jingheng to Chiang Kai-shek Clarifying Three Suspicions Regarding Ouyang Ge's Corruption and Requesting Careful Investigation" (August 17, 1940), held at the "National Archives" in Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/617/005.

⑤ Ouyang Ge: "Will of Ouyang Ge," in Chen Zhenfu, A Grain in the Vast Sea, self-published, 1995, p. 30. Chen Zhenfu was a student of the fourth class of the Submarine Mine College, later graduated from the fifth class of the Qingdao Naval Academy, and after going to Taiwan in 1949, rose to the rank of Rear Admiral in the Navy.

⑥ Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary (manuscript), April 1, 1926.

⑦ Yang Tianshi, “The Arrest of Ouyang Ge—Exploring the Zhongshan Warship Incident, Part II,” in Guomindang Members and the Early Republic of China, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007, pp. 386–388.

⑧ After the victory of the Eastern Expedition, Ouyang Ge served as Acting Director of the Naval Bureau of the Guangdong Nationalist Government and Vice Principal of the Naval School of the Guangdong Nationalist Government, during which time he maintained close relations with Chiang Kai-shek. In the subsequent “Zhongshan Warship Incident,” Ouyang Ge was one of the direct planners.

Furthermore, although Chiang Kai-shek valued Ouyang Ge’s naval talents, he was deeply concerned about Ouyang Ge’s many flaws. First, he was dissatisfied with Ouyang Ge’s boastful and showy personality. As early as after the “April 12 Incident,” Ouyang Ge had compiled his experiences during the “Zhongshan Warship Incident” into a document to claim credit with Chiang Kai-shek, only to be severely reprimanded. Additionally, Ouyang Ge often boasted to outsiders about his early relationships with Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, even hanging a photograph of the three of them in his living room with great pride.① During his tenure overseeing the Submarine Mine College, similar behavior by Ouyang Ge was commonplace and frequently displeased Chiang Kai-shek. Even those close to him, such as Chen Guofu, considered him “arrogant in his usual demeanor, easily arousing jealousy in others.”②

Since the establishment of the Submarine Mine College, it had consistently presented itself as an army unit to avoid interference from the Ministry of the Navy. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly demanded that the ordering and acceptance of warships and other weaponry be conducted in a non-public or even secret manner to avoid attracting outside attention. For example, in November 1935, the torpedo boats and other equipment ordered by the Submarine Mine College were arranged for secret delivery and inspection.③ In September 1935, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Jiangnan Shipyard to formally transfer the two shallow-water gunboats, Tongxin and Tongde, to the Submarine Mine College, and also agreed to Ouyang Ge’s request to equip the two ships with the latest large-caliber naval guns.④ However, Ouyang Ge made a great fuss over this, holding a formal acceptance ceremony and inviting key figures from various military and political agencies to attend. This move was entirely unexpected by Chiang. In a telegram, Chiang angrily rebuked him for “making a big fuss, being showy, and causing trouble.”⑤ Ouyang Ge later had to defend himself by claiming that “various agencies were concerned about the Submarine Mine College and requested visits, hence the hospitality.”⑥ Furthermore, Ouyang Ge had planned to have the ships of the Submarine Mine College fly the naval flag and to have students and instructors wear naval uniforms.⑦ Upon learning of this, Chiang Kai-shek was equally displeased and urgently called a halt.⑧ In July 1936, Chiang even temporarily placed the Tongxin and Tongde under the command of the Chongqing Field Headquarters.⑨

In addition to disliking Ouyang Ge’s showy personality, rumors of Ouyang Ge’s corruption and embezzlement also greatly concerned Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, the reason Chiang Kai-shek had originally chosen Ouyang Ge to head the Submarine Mine College was his belief in Ouyang Ge’s integrity. In August 1932, he informed Lu Dipin, then Chairman of Zhejiang Province, that the Zhejiang Water Police Department was rife with corruption and urgently needed reform, stating that “if Ouyang Ge were the director, progress would surely be made.”⑩ In November of the same year, He Yingqin was tasked with organizing the Submarine Mine College and initially recommended Ling Xiao, a former Northeast Navy general, to take charge. However, Chiang Kai-shek held Ling Xiao in very low regard, believing that he had only defected to the Nanjing government after his failed rebellion against Shen Honglie during the “Laoshan Incident.” Consequently, Ouyang Ge, who was then in Zhenhai, Zhejiang, had the opportunity to be transferred to Jiangyin and subsequently take charge of the Submarine Mine College.

However, after Ouyang Ge took office, news of his “corruption and abuse of power” and “improper conduct” spread rapidly. As early as April and May 1933, during the initial establishment of the Submarine Mine College, there were already accusations that Ouyang Ge was “corrupt, accepting bribes, neglecting his duties, and harming the people.” Chiang Kai-shek specifically dispatched his confidant, Yu Jishi, then Director of the Zhejiang Provincial Security Department, to investigate, but the matter was dropped due to a lack of concrete evidence.① During his tenure overseeing the Xingzi national defense projects, there were also doubts raised regarding irregularities in Ouyang Ge’s use of funds.② Besides questions about the use of funds, the Submarine Mine College was also embroiled in a major scandal involving “Ouyang Ge allowing Italian instructors to bring prostitutes into the school.” An angry Chiang Kai-shek, refusing to allow Ouyang Ge to defend himself, explicitly ordered that the matter “must not be settled casually,” and immediately ordered the dismissal of the Italian advisor “to enforce discipline.”③

① Xu Yuzhi, “What I Know About the Submarine Mine College,” Zhenjiang Cultural and Historical Materials, Vol. 17, pp. 6–9.

② Telegram from Chen Guofu et al. to Chiang Kai-shek Regarding Ouyang Ge’s Detention and Request for Early Release to Redeem Himself Through Meritorious Service, Daily Report, July 20, 1938, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/500/039.

③ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Ouyang Ge Regarding the Secret Delivery of Torpedoes and Boats at Hukou, October 22, 1935, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/256/129.

④ Zhou Meihua (ed. and annot.), Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek: Drafts of Events, Vol. 32, Taipei: Institute of Modern History, 2008, pp. 553–554.

⑤ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Rebuking Ouyang Ge for Holding a Ceremony for the Two Ships Tongxin and Tongde, December 27, 1935, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/010200/149/035.

⑥ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Ouyang Ge Inquiring Why the Two Small Ships Tongxin and Tongde Were Held with Excessive Showiness, and Ouyang Ge’s Reply, December 27–28, 1935, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020/026/065.

⑦ The Ministry of the Navy protested that the Submarine Mine College was not part of the naval system and demanded a ban on wearing naval uniforms; the Ministry of Military Affairs also intervened in this dispute. See Ministry of the Navy Official Letter No. 1296, Naval Gazette, 1936, Issue 82, pp. 248–249.

⑧ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Ordering Ouyang Ge That the Ships Tongxin, Tongde, Huaan, etc., Are Not Permitted to Fly the Naval Flag or Wear Naval Uniforms, January 18, 1936, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/010200/150/020.

⑨ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek Ordering Ouyang Ge That the Two Ships Tongxin and Tongde Are to Be Under the Command of the Chongqing Field Headquarters, July 3, 1936, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/010200/163/011.

⑩ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Lu Dipin Regarding the Corruption in the Zhejiang Water Police Department, the Need for Reform, and the Recommendation of Ouyang Ge as Director, August 8, 1932, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/01020000/070/029.

① *Telegram from He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek Suggesting That Initial Torpedo Training Is Best Conducted in Nanjing and Proposing the Appointment of Ling Xiao, and Chiang Kai-shek’s Reply to Temporarily Withhold the Appointment*, December 28, 1932, Taipei, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/411/155.

Since the 1920s, Chiang Kai-shek had generally employed methods of military pressure, economic bribery, and political compromise to subdue other factions, sometimes resorting to unscrupulous means. However, he had high standards for the political integrity of his own inner circle. As the Submarine Mine College was intended to be the naval branch of his inner circle, he naturally hoped that its leader would possess both “virtue and talent.” Around 1932, one of Chiang Kai-shek’s greatest concerns was the so-called “lack of cadres,” leading him to note that “finding talented individuals is not easy; one must settle for second-best and cannot have overly high expectations.”④ Although he was well aware of Ouyang Ge’s many serious flaws, given the circumstances at the time, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to employ him. Nevertheless, while heavily relying on Ouyang Ge, Chiang’s negative impressions of him gradually accumulated.

After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Submarine Mine College under Ouyang Ge not only failed to achieve any noteworthy combat results but also repeatedly encountered mishaps. At the same time, rumors of Ouyang Ge’s favoritism and perversion of the law were incessant, naturally causing Chiang Kai-shek to recall the many previous shortcomings of this individual. Within the navy, some accused Ouyang Ge of falsely reporting losses and using the opportunity to embezzle funds. Although Ouyang Ge offered defenses and clarifications, Chiang Kai-shek, who had long intended to abolish the Submarine Mine College, severely reprimanded him.⑤ Around the time of this case, the National Government was preparing to promulgate the Provisional Regulations on Rectifying Corruption, which explicitly stated that those who “withhold military pay,” those who “engage in malpractice in the construction of military engineering projects and the procurement of military supplies,” and those who “steal and sell military supplies” could all be sentenced to death or imprisonment of ten years or more. The Ouyang Ge case came at a timely juncture.⑥

In the Battle of Matang, Ouyang Ge commanded the laying of mines on the river surface and similarly faced accusations of dereliction of duty and corruption. Before the battle, Chiang Kai-shek paid special attention to the matter, constantly worrying that the mines would fail to effectively block the river, and repeatedly inquired beforehand about “the degree of strengthening of the river blockade works in the minefield area, and whether there had been progress.”⑦ He also carefully instructed the river defense forces to “attach more flat-trajectory guns” and ensured that naval vessels were fully prepared for combat.⑧ Regarding the vessels of the Submarine Mine College, he pointed out to the Ministry of Military Administration that “attention had not been paid to the application of naval vessels,” requesting statistics on surface vessels, including those of the Submarine Mine College, and the formulation of a joint land-sea defense plan.⑨ However, the minefield laid under Ouyang Ge’s command was easily breached by the Japanese fleet. Afterwards, Xu Zushan, who was responsible for supervising the Matang defenses, used this as grounds to accuse Ouyang Ge of missing the opportunity for battle and embezzling mine funds, resulting in ineffective mine-laying that failed to prevent the enemy’s advance via the waterway. Gu Zhutong also stated that the Submarine Mine College was “completely unable to provide support for river surface deployments or field army operations.”⑩ When Ouyang Ge was arrested in June 1938, the primary charges were “delaying military intelligence and unclear facts regarding funds handled.”① In the report from the Military Affairs Commission to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fifth National Congress of the Kuomintang, it was also stated that Ouyang Ge’s main crime was “delaying military operations.”②

① “Telegram from Yu Jishi to Chiang Kai-shek: A Review of Ouyang Ge’s Solicitation of Bribes and Drawing of Pay for Non-existent Personnel in Ship Allocations, with No Funds for Coal Purchases” (May 17, 1933), held in the “Academia Historica,” Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/087/083.

② For details on the construction of the Xingzi defense works, see “Ouyang Ge’s Request for Allocation of Funds for Xingzi Defense Works and Other Matters” (March 20, 1935), held in the “Academia Historica,” Taipei, General Catalogue of Military Engineering Archives, 001/073300/001.

③ “Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Ouyang Ge: The Italian Advisor Rodiolo’s Summoning of Prostitutes to the School Must Not Be Handled Casually, etc.” (July 2, 1935), held in the “Academia Historica,” Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/060100/098/002.

④ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek (manuscript), April 4, 1932.

⑤ “Telegram from Ouyang Ge to Chiang Kai-shek: Clarification of Equipment and Fast Boat Losses During Retreat, and the Quantity of Existing and Ordered British and German Fast Boats and Fast Boat Motherships, etc.” (May 6, 1938), held in the “Academia Historica,” Taipei, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/497/035.

⑥ “The National Government Promulgated the ‘Provisional Regulations on Rectifying Corruption’ the Previous Day,” Shen Bao, June 29, 1938, Page 2.

⑦ “Telegram from Chairman Chiang Kai-shek to Liu Jianxu, Commander-in-Chief of the Tenth Group Army: To Effectively Rectify the Gun Positions, Communication Trenches, and Mine Laying at the Matang Fortress, and to Strengthen the River Blockade Works,” edited by Qin Xiaoyi: Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China—The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Volume 2, “Course of Operations” (3), Taipei, Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, Party History Committee, 1981 edition, p. 21.

⑧ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek (manuscript), June 12, 1938.

⑨ “Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to He Yingqin et al.,” edited by Qin Xiaoyi: Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China—The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Volume 2, “Course of Operations” (2), Taipei, Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, Party History Committee, 1981 edition, p. 311.

⑩ Compiled by Zhang Li: Oral History of Mr. Li Yuxi, p. 16.

① “Telegram from Gu Zhutong, Commander-in-Chief of the Third War Zone, Reporting the Successive Fall of the Matang and Hukou Fortresses,” edited by Qin Xiaoyi: Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China—The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Volume 2, “Course of Operations” (2), pp. 317–319.

Given that Chiang Kai-shek disliked Ouyang Ge’s many words and deeds, and deemed him militarily incompetent after the outbreak of the War of Resistance, why was the Ouyang Ge case delayed for two years before a final verdict was reached?

IV. Chiang Kai-shek’s Final Verdict

If one refers to other high-ranking generals who faced military justice during the War of Resistance, it becomes evident that a case like Ouyang Ge’s, where the individual was dismissed from office but remained unsentenced for two years and was even granted bail during that period, was unprecedented. Whether the charges were “poor performance in combat,” “retreating in the face of the enemy,” “dereliction of duty,” or “corruption and bribery,” the vast majority of those arrested were “sanctioned” within a very short time after the incident. For example, during the Eastern Henan Campaign in 1938, Long Muhan, the commander of the 88th Division and a graduate of the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy, was dismissed and arrested for “poor performance in combat” and executed less than a month later. Similarly, Feng Ti was also executed within a month following the “Wenxi Great Fire.” The execution of Wang Haonan, then Commander of the Ningbo Defense, for “dereliction of duty” was particularly sudden; Chiang Kai-shek even required Gu Zhutong to arrest and prosecute him within a specified timeframe.③ Xue Weiying, who was also dismissed due to the fall of the Matang Fortress, was executed by firing squad in July 1938.

Although naval talent was scarce, the Chinese navy had by then been almost entirely annihilated, rendering professional naval expertise largely useless, and thus it could not provide Ouyang Ge with any additional protection. Therefore, the fact that the final verdict in the Ouyang Ge case, who faced serious charges of “poor performance in combat” and “corruption,” was delayed for two years, may have been related to Ouyang Ge’s deep political and party background.

As a veteran member of the Kuomintang, Ouyang Ge had been closely associated with the right-wing faction of the Kuomintang in his early years; Hu Hanmin had even willingly written a preface for his translation. Upon returning to China and resuming his career in 1930, he maintained close interactions with various figures, including those from the “Western Hills Conference faction.”④ After taking charge of the Submarine Mine College, he gradually established good relationships with He Yingqin, Chen Lifu, Chen Guofu, and Wu Tiecheng; he was also a native of Jiangxi like Gui Yongqing, and they had cooperated since the early days of the Submarine Mine College, developing a deep friendship. In November 1935, at the Fifth National Congress of the Kuomintang, through extensive lobbying, Ouyang Ge was elected as an alternate member of the Fifth Central Supervisory Committee, re-establishing his political status within the Kuomintang central apparatus and becoming increasingly active in party affairs.

Due to the aforementioned reasons, after Ouyang Ge’s dismissal, many figures from military and political circles within the Kuomintang pleaded for him, including several heavyweight personalities. Chen Guofu, Chen Lifu, Wu Tiecheng, Yu Hanmou, and Li Zongren jointly sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek after learning of the case, seeking to intercede on his behalf. On July 16, 1938, Chen Guofu sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek hoping that he would consider that Ouyang Ge “may have had faults, but having devoted his life to the navy, he possesses specialized expertise; please release him soon so that he may atone for his crimes through merit, fulfill his long-standing ambition to build the navy, and continue to serve the country.”⑤ After investigating the military engineering projects handled by Ouyang Ge, the Ministry of Military Administration concluded that “there were no records to verify any of the projects,” and even suggested “returning them for correction or temporarily keeping them on file.”⑥ Similarly, after the quartermaster department investigated and audited the accounts of the Submarine Mine College, they only stated that “the facts regarding the funds handled by Ouyang Ge were unclear,” but could not produce conclusive evidence of his corruption.⑦ On July 20, Chiang Kai-shek, while reviewing Chen Guo

① Report on the Liquidation of the Submarine Mine College, Taipei, Archives of the Ministry of National Defense, National Army Archives, 109/3512.

② Military Report to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fifth National Congress (January–October 1939), in Selected Historical Materials on the Kuomintang Battlefield during the War of Resistance Against Japan, Vol. 1, compiled and printed by the Zhejiang Provincial Research Group on the History of the Chinese Kuomintang, 1986, p. 200.

③ Telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Gu Zhutong Inquiring Whether Wang Haonan Had Been Arrested and Demanding a Detailed Reply within Three Days, Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/01030000/018/020.

④ In the late 1920s, Ouyang Ge developed a strong interest in Italian Fascism and even translated a relevant monograph, for which Hu Hanmin wrote the preface. See Salvemini, translated by Ouyang Ge, The Dictatorship of Italian Fascism, Minzhi Book Bureau, 1929 edition.

⑤ *Daily Report of Telegrams from Chen Guofu and Others to Chiang Kai-shek, Stating That Upon Hearing of Ouyang Ge’s Imprisonment, They Urged His Early Release to Redeem His Crime by Meritorious Service, etc.* (July 20, 1938), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/500/039.

⑥ Daily Report of Telegrams from He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek Regarding the Ministry’s Handling of Projects at Jiangyin, Xingzi, etc., for the Submarine Mine College (September 20, 1938), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/502/156.

⑦ Report on the Liquidation of the Submarine Mine College, Taipei, Archives of the Ministry of National Defense, National Army Archives, 109/3512.

When the telegram pleading for clemency arrived, he also annotated it with “Approved.”①

Consequently, the Ouyang Ge case was left in a state of prolonged suspension, and he himself seemed temporarily spared from the threat of execution. In August 1939, five students from the Submarine Mine College, including Xie Yanchi and Wang Enhua, visited Ouyang Ge in Chongqing and found that “his family members could also live together with him, with only a few guards assigned to monitor him,” and that his daily “movements were still considered relatively free.”② In early 1940, Ouyang Ge was even released on bail and stayed at the residence of Xiao Zheng in Nanwenquan, Ba County, Sichuan. During this period, he maintained correspondence with former students and instructors of the Submarine Mine College, asking students to “inform me of your current situation at any time” and advising them that “diligence can compensate for lack of talent, and prudence can keep slander at bay”; at the same time, he reassured the people from the Submarine Mine College that his place of residence had “pleasant scenery” conducive to recuperation.③

After June 1940, the Ouyang Ge case, which had seemingly begun to subside, suddenly flared up again. News emerged that Ouyang Ge’s wife, Zhang Jingqiu, held $130,000 in savings in the United States, which was considered solid evidence of embezzled funds.④ Upon learning this, Chiang Kai-shek was furious and demanded the immediate launch of a new round of military judicial review. This review not only investigated the source of Ouyang Ge’s overseas deposits but also reopened the old issues of missing the opportunity for battle and fraud in procurement. Due to Chiang Kai-shek’s direct instructions, various military departments and commissions assigned dedicated personnel to participate in the interrogation, demanding a thorough investigation to the bottom. As a result, this case, which had dragged on for two years, reached a final verdict in less than two months.

When the news of the death sentence spread, many military and political figures within the Kuomintang who were on good terms with Ouyang Ge were all surprised. Chen Lifu, Chen Guofu, He Jian, Li Liejun, Zhang Dingfan, Zhang Ji, and others successively pleaded for clemency on his behalf. On August 17, Wu Zhihui personally wrote to Chiang Kai-shek, stating: “At the time, because Mr. Ouyang Ge had shown bravery and determination on the Zhongshan Warship in the past, and later took risks against the Izumo, he was a hero among our Central Committee members; even if he may have jeopardized naval operations, I dare to request lenient treatment.”⑤ In a long letter of over 2,000 characters, Wu Zhihui defended Ouyang Ge, arguing that his overseas deposits were absolutely not obtained through embezzlement or bribery, but came from his wife’s dowry, and then hoped that “the Chairman has already treated this important case with caution, allowing it to drag on for a long time,” and that “it would be best if the Chairman granted more time, dispatched personnel to conduct a detailed investigation into the points mentioned above, so that public opinion would be fully convinced.”⑥ At the same time, Wu Zhihui also pointed out that Ouyang Ge was a descendant of a renowned family, and “Mr. Ouyang Jingwu is indeed revered by the virtuous men of the nation; please pay attention to this case and be extremely cautious.” In the letter, he even admonished Chiang Kai-shek: “To execute one corrupt official to warn the masses is a sacrifice that should be made today. But if this judgment has oversights, and an undeserved wrong is done to a person of outstanding merit, it is enough to discourage the virtuous and cause them to lose heart.”⑦ On the afternoon of the 18th, Wu Zhihui specifically visited Chiang Kai-shek to “discuss the Ouyang Ge matter,” pleading for him face-to-face.⑧

Despite the earnest pleas from Wu Zhihui and others, they could not change Chiang Kai-shek’s determination to dispose of Ouyang Ge. On August 19, Chiang Kai-shek specifically convened an enlarged joint Memorial Week meeting at the Military Commission for this matter, where he “announced Ouyang Ge’s capital crime,” with the specific charges being “disobeying orders, abandoning weapons and fleeing, and engaging in embezzlement.”⑨ After announcing the verdict, he specifically pointed out that “Ouyang Ge committed fraud and lost the Madang Fortress; despite his previous merits, he should still be executed by firing squad.”⑩ In addition, Chiang specifically stated that the disposition of Ouyang Ge was not improper, and he “severely criticized those comrades in our Party who pleaded for his leniency.”⑩ Furthermore, according to Ouyang Ge’s will, before being led to the execution ground, “the warden came to ask me to write a letter to the Chairman,” clarifying and explaining the various past accusations: “(1) Where was I personally during the retreat from Nanjing? (2) Matters concerning the transfer of German boats to Xingzi for training: (3) The handling of the fast boats when Madang fell: (4) Reasons why the financial management was unrelated to me.”① This shows that although the death sentence had been issued, Chiang Kai-shek was still very concerned about the details of accusations such as “embezzlement” and “poor combat performance,” to the extent that he required Ouyang Ge to clarify everything clearly before his execution.

① Daily Report of Telegrams from He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek Regarding the Ministry’s Handling of Projects at Jiangyin, Xingzi, etc., for the Submarine Mine College (September 20, 1938), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/080200/502/156.

② Xie Yanchi: “The Flesh-and-Blood Great Wall of the Naval Submarine Mine College: Historical Facts of Teachers and Students Fighting the War Before and After the War of Resistance,” Chinese and Foreign Magazine (Taipei), Issue 4, 2007, pp. 47–61.

③ Ouyang Ge: “Two Handwritten Instructions from Dean Ouyang Jiuyuan,” in Fu Hongrang, Collected Footprints in the Snow (Xueni Hongzhao Ji), self-published, publication date unknown, pp. 48–49. Fu Hongrang was a graduate of the first class of the Submarine Mine College, and after going to Taiwan in 1949, he rose to the rank of Rear Admiral in the Navy.

④ This claim appears in Wu Zhihui’s letter to Chiang Kai-shek, arguing that this was Ouyang Ge’s wife’s dowry. See Letter from Wu Jingheng to Chiang Kai-shek Clarifying Three Suspicions Regarding Ouyang Ge’s Embezzlement and Requesting Careful Investigation (August 17, 1940), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/617/005.

⑤ Letter from Wu Jingheng to Chiang Kai-shek Clarifying Three Suspicions Regarding Ouyang Ge’s Embezzlement and Requesting Careful Investigation (August 17, 1940), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/617/005.

⑥ Letter from Wu Jingheng to Chiang Kai-shek Clarifying Three Suspicions Regarding Ouyang Ge’s Embezzlement and Requesting Careful Investigation (August 17, 1940), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/617/005.

⑦ Letter from Wu Jingheng to Chiang Kai-shek Clarifying Three Suspicions Regarding Ouyang Ge’s Embezzlement and Requesting Careful Investigation (August 17, 1940), Taipei, Academia Historica, Presidential Archives of Chiang Kai-shek, 002/08020000/617/005.

⑧ Diary of Chiang Kai-shek (manuscript), August 18, 1940.

⑨ Xu Yongchang: Diary of Xu Yongchang, Vol. 5, Taipei, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990 edition, p. 391.

⑩ Weng Wenhao, compiled by Li Xuetong, Liu Ping, and Weng Xinjun, Diaries of Weng Wenhao, Zhonghua Book Company, 2010 edition, p. 510; Wang Shijie, Diaries of Wang Shijie, Vol. 2, Taipei, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990 edition, pp. 328–329.

① Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek (manuscript), August 19, 1940; Wang Shijie, Diaries of Wang Shijie, Vol. 2, pp. 328–329.

As an authoritarian leader under an authoritarian system, Chiang Kai-shek prioritized reliability and loyalty to himself above all else when selecting personnel from his own faction. As Ho Lien stated, “From the Chairman’s perspective, the importance of personal relationships exceeded that of institutional facilities, and the Chairman’s demands for his subordinates’ loyalty and obedience exceeded his demands for their talent and integrity.”② Amidst the factional strife within the navy, the primary reason Ouyang Ge was initially favored lay in his extremely senior background within the Kuomintang and his consistent political support for Chiang. This characteristic of personnel selection was extremely common in the political decision-making of authoritarian leaders, exhibiting a certain commonality in behavioral patterns, namely adopting an autocratic and arbitrary attitude in personnel matters. However, such favor did not mean that Chiang Kai-shek was entirely laissez-faire regarding the professional capabilities and moral conduct of his inner circle. As an authoritarian leader, Chiang Kai-shek also needed what was called “image management.” Consequently, he actually placed great importance on the military and political achievements and the moral conduct of his inner circle. This was because it directly affected Chiang’s own political prestige as the “Supreme Leader” and the legitimacy of his control over other factions, and his suspicious personality was likely to amplify any personal flaws he could not tolerate.

During the process of favoring Ouyang Ge, Chiang Kai-shek had long been dissatisfied with his daily words and deeds, and his lackluster combat record and frequent scandals made Chiang himself unwilling to continue supporting him. If such circumstances accumulated over time, they could lead him to decisively change his previous personnel decisions, especially when the military and political environment underwent drastic changes. After 1938, Chinese naval forces, including the Central Navy and the Submarine Mine College, had no room for maneuver, so it was reasonable for Chiang Kai-shek to resolutely abandon Ouyang Ge at this juncture. Although constrained by the network of intra-party relationships, which led to a temporary suspension of the final ruling on the Ouyang Ge case, once new evidence emerged, Chiang Kai-shek swiftly and ruthlessly resolved the case to demonstrate his resolve in personnel and administrative matters.

V. Chiang Kai-shek’s Reorganization of the Navy After the Ouyang Ge Case

Although Chiang Kai-shek dealt with Ouyang Ge and dissolved the Submarine Mine College, this did not mean he took a suppressive attitude toward all factional forces from the former Submarine Mine College; in fact, the opposite was true. At the time of the school’s dissolution, there were over 300 students from the third cohort who had not yet graduated. The original plan was to transfer all of them to the Foochow Navy School (Mawei), which was dominated by the Foochow faction, but this was resisted by both students and instructors. On July 6, 1938, they submitted a petition to He Yingqin requesting alternative arrangements, stating with considerable grief and indignation: “The situation in the navy is special and deteriorating with each passing day, which is truly heartbreaking, and there is no hope for the future.”③ Upon learning of this situation, Chiang Kai-shek instructed the Ministry of Military Administration to transfer these students to the Qingdao Navy School, which had originally belonged to the Northeast Navy. All instructors and teaching equipment were also transferred to the Qingdao Navy School.

Furthermore, just as Chen Shaokuan was preparing to take over the equipment of the Submarine Mine College, the Ministry of Military Administration assigned Major General Wu Anzhi from the army to handle the post-dissolution cleanup and informed the Naval Command to postpone the takeover. Subsequently, the takeover personnel from the Naval Command discovered that “there were only a few thousand gallons of gasoline, enough for only a few hours of use, and the torpedoes were sufficient for only one launch before being exhausted… one would think the Submarine Mine College’s oil reserves were more than this,” leading them to suspect that the Ministry of Military Administration had withheld supplies.④ As for the equipment left by the Submarine Mine College in Hong Kong, the Ministry of Military Administration similarly did not allow the Naval Command to intervene directly. Ultimately, the Central Navy only obtained two British-made torpedo boats, while the training ship Free China and a large quantity of supplies were transferred to the Qingdao Navy School.⑤

After 1940, the Chinese navy was virtually non-existent, and the Foochow faction’s navy shrank accordingly. It was only rebuilt towards the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan through the receipt of aid ships from Britain and the United States. At this time, the Ministry of Military Administration intervened in naval affairs again. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s direction, the Naval Division was established in September 1945 to begin preparations for the comprehensive takeover of the navy. On December 28, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dissolution of the Naval General Command, with all its authority and responsibilities transferred to the Naval Division of the Ministry of Military Administration. Just two days later, Chen Shaokuan was forced to resign and hand over power, bringing to an end the nearly 20-year history of the Foochow faction’s dominance over the Central Navy.① In March 1946, the Naval Division was expanded and reorganized into the Naval Bureau; in July, it was restored to the Naval General Command, subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense; and in September, Gui Yongqing, a native of Jiangxi like Ouyang Ge, was appointed Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

① Ouyang Ge, Ouyang Ge’s Will, in Chen Zhenfu, A Grain in the Vast Sea, p. 30.

② Ho Lien, translated by Zhu Youci et al., Memoirs of Ho Lien, China Literature and History Press, 2012 edition, pp. 245–246.

③ Case of the Reorganization of the Submarine Mine College, Taipei, Ministry of National Defense Archives, National Army Archives, 582.3/1071.2.

④ Case of the Dissolution and Transfer of the Submarine Mine College, Taipei, Ministry of National Defense Archives, National Army Archives, 107.3/1071.3.

⑤ Case of the Dissolution and Transfer of the Submarine Mine College, Taipei, Ministry of National Defense Archives, National Army Archives, 107.3/1071.3.

After Gui Yongqing took control of the navy, non-Foochow personnel, represented by the Submarine Mine College faction, began to gather again and gradually replaced the Foochow faction’s position in the navy.② By May 1947, out of 514 officers and staff under the Naval General Command, only 92 were from the Foochow faction, “a drop from nearly 80% during Chen Shaokuan’s era to 18%.”③ Although Ouyang Ge had been executed during the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek at this time heavily employed a large number of naval officers who had graduated from the Submarine Mine College. After the Kuomintang regime retreated to Taiwan, the Submarine Mine College faction’s officer corps became one of the true cores of its naval power. Taking just the 28 graduates from the first cohort of the Submarine Mine College who came to Taiwan as an example, three rose to the rank of full general, ten to lieutenant general, and as many as ten to major general. Among these Submarine Mine College faction generals, Li Yuxi, a graduate of the first cohort of the Submarine Mine College, even served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for the Taiwan authorities.④

Since this group of graduates from the Submarine Mine College gradually occupied many key positions in the Kuomintang navy and thereby gained a voice, their efforts to rehabilitate Ouyang Ge never ceased. In the summer of 1971, when Li Yuxi met with Chiang Kai-shek, he directly stated, “Educator Ouyang was executed during the War of Resistance, but he was truly wronged,” and requested a thorough reinvestigation and rehabilitation.⑤ Chiang Kai-shek neither agreed nor disagreed, first asking Li Yuxi to list the facts and submit a formal written report. He subsequently indicated that Ouyang Ge could be rehabilitated and his reputation cleared at an appropriate time. However, Chiang Kai-shek was already seriously ill at the time and died shortly thereafter, so the so-called rehabilitation came to nothing. On August 20, 1991, the commemorative event for the 50th anniversary of Ouyang Ge’s death was quite grand. More than 100 students from the first to the fourth cohorts of the Submarine Mine College attended, and the elderly Chen Lifu and Xiao Zheng personally paid their respects. However, if one reads the memoirs by cadres of the Submarine Mine College faction regarding Ouyang Ge’s death, one finds that they mostly attributed his fate to suppression by the Fujian faction of the navy, believing that Ouyang Ge “was framed by others taking advantage of the situation.”⑥ At the same time, they all consistently avoided discussing the decisive role played by Chiang Kai-shek before and after this incident, even going so far as to “exonerate” him. For example, graduates of the Submarine Mine College such as Xie Yanchi wrote articles suspecting that Ouyang Ge’s sudden execution was carried out secretly by someone while Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin were absent from Chongqing.⑦

Although Ouyang Ge, who aimed to build a “New Navy,” ultimately suffered the death penalty, the Submarine Mine College faction he cultivated later branched out and grew within the Kuomintang navy, gradually strengthening and eventually dominating the development pattern of the naval forces of the Kuomintang regime. Before and after the Ouyang Ge case, it was always Chiang Kai-shek himself who truly determined the fate of Ouyang Ge and the Submarine Mine College. A careful analysis of the entire process of Ouyang Ge’s promotion and appointment, dismissal and arrest, and execution before and after the War of Resistance, combined with the military and political background of the time, makes it easy to discern the logic and causal connections behind Chiang Kai-shek’s handling of naval personnel issues.

[The author, Sha Qingqing, is an assistant researcher at the Information Consulting and Research Center of the Shanghai Library.]

(Responsible editor: Ma Xiaojuan)

① For the specific process, see Zhang Li, “Chen Shaokuan and the Republican Navy,” in the Editorial Group of The Inheritance of Historiography (ed.), The Inheritance of Historiography: Essays in Honor of Jiang Yongjing’s 80th Birthday, Taipei, Modern China Publishing House, 2001 edition, pp. 215–238.

② Gui Yongqing had no prior naval experience, and opinions about him varied greatly among different parties after he went to Taiwan. Those from the Submarine Mine College who were promoted by Gui, such as Li Yuxi, held him in high regard, while those from the Fujian faction mostly held negative views. This detail also reflects the expansion of the Submarine Mine College faction’s influence within the Kuomintang navy after the War of Resistance, especially after the Kuomintang regime moved to Taiwan.

③ Gao Xiaoxing and Shi Ping, The Rise and Fall of the Republican Navy, p. 234.

④ Among the first cohort of graduates from the Submarine Mine College who went to Taiwan, those promoted to full general were Li Yuxi, Cui Zhidao, and Wang Enhua; those promoted to lieutenant general were Yang Weizhi, Duan Yiming, Sun Su, Cao Kaijian, Ma Yanheng, Li Dunqian, Guo Fa’ao, Qi Hongzhang, Wang Xiandeng, and Yuan Tiechen; and those promoted to major general were Yang Zhen, Li Liangji, Yan Haibo, Jin Longyun, Zhao Hanliang, Huang Zhenbai, Wang Ji, Chen Yuanrun, Zhao Zhengchang, and Fu Hongrang.

⑤ Zhang Li (ed.), Oral History of Mr. Li Yuxi, pp. 16–17.

⑥ Chen Zhenfu, A Grain in the Vast Sea, p. 32.

⑦ Xie Yanchi, “The Flesh-and-Blood Great Wall of the Naval Submarine Mine College: Historical Facts of Teachers and Students Fighting the War Before and After the War of Resistance,” Chinese and Foreign Magazine (Taipei), Issue 4, 2007, pp. 47–61.