Constructing the Enemy: Undercurrents of the Gouzenko Affair

On the evening of September 5, 1945, the evening shift editor of the Ottawa Journal was visited by an uninvited guest—a young man with a thick Russian accent. He identified himself as Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk from the Soviet Embassy, affiliated with the Soviet military intelligence agency, the GRU, and claimed to be carrying confidential documents capable of exposing so-called "Soviet sleeper spies." After hearing this "shocking" story, the evening editor seemed uninterested and instead suggested that he should go to the Canadian Department of Justice rather than seek help from the newspaper. In fact, before coming to the Ottawa Journal, Gouzenko had already visited the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, but the officer on duty refused to believe the convoluted story. When Gouzenko arrived at the Department of Justice, he was still turned away, as the civil servants had already left for the day.

In contrast to the "nonchalance" of the Canadian side, Gouzenko had made meticulous preparations for this defection. He spent two weeks selecting the documents to provide to the Canadian authorities, even deliberately marking them by folding the corners, so that on September 5 he could quickly extract and take away as many as 109 documents and the codebook in just a few minutes. The following morning, Gouzenko, accompanied by his wife and young son, and carrying those confidential documents, visited the Department of Justice again. The Minister of Justice at the time, Louis St. Laurent, initially did not trust this suddenly appearing "defector" and had no intention of accepting him and his family. In the view of this senior Canadian official, with World War II having just ended, the Soviet Union was still widely regarded as an ally in the joint fight against the "Fascist Axis," and rashly accepting a "defector" of unknown background did not seem like a good choice. However, at this time, Western

The Construction of the Enemy: Undercurrents Behind the Gouzenko Affair

Sha Qingqing

public opinion had already shown signs of gradually deteriorating attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

Melvyn Leffler, a renowned authority on Cold War history, in his seminal work A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, regards the period immediately following the end of World War II as a critical time for the "repositioning of US-Soviet relations." From the summer of 1945 to the spring of 1946, public attitudes in many Western countries rapidly deteriorated from viewing the Soviet Union as a "wartime ally" to seeing it as an "enemy." According to opinion polls, as high as 55% of American respondents in March 1945 believed the Soviet Union could be trusted, but by March 1946, this figure had plummeted to 35%. Compared to changes in public opinion, Leffler argues that the adjustment of Western policies toward the Soviet Union, represented by Truman, actually preceded shifts in public sentiment. In this process of adjustment, the "Gouzenko Affair" became a highly symbolic example.

Deeply desperate and frustrated, the Gouzenko family had to temporarily return to their apartment. In the middle of the night, staff from the Soviet Embassy indeed came knocking. After banging on the door for a long time with no response, they directly pried open the door to the Gouzenkos' apartment. At this time, the Gouzenko family was hiding in the neighbor's apartment across the hall and had called the police. Soon after, Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers arrived on the scene. A fierce verbal confrontation erupted between the two sides, but the Soviets ultimately failed to bring back their cipher clerk and also failed to retrieve the stolen confidential documents.

Although St. Laurent did not accept Gouzenko immediately, he did report the relevant information to Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his staff. Norman Robertson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, upon learning of the matter, directly instructed the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to take the Gouzenko family away early on the seventh and interrogate them. According to accounts disclosed afterwards, the documents carried by Gouzenko revealed to Western countries the existence of an intelligence network within the Canadian government and the British High Commission in Ottawa that leaked information to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had obtained confidential intelligence on the atomic bomb development projects of Canada, Britain, and the United States through its espionage activities. On the same day Gouzenko was taken away, the Soviet Embassy formally notified the Canadian government that Gouzenko had committed theft and demanded that he be handed over to the embassy for disposal. The Canadian government denied that Gouzenko was in their custody, stating only that they would assist in "searching" for the man. On the other hand, Robertson, representing the Canadian government, informed

Stewart Menzies, the head of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), who happened to be on a business trip in Ottawa, of the matter. Menzies immediately realized the gravity of the situation and strongly urged the Canadian government to take swift action to provide protection.

It goes without saying that any diplomatic mission itself bears the task of collecting various types of information and public opinion in the host country. However, according to the content disclosed by Gouzenko himself and the documents he carried, the Soviet embassies in Canada, Britain, and the United States during World War II were primarily engaged in intelligence gathering, even operating a so-called "spy network" spanning major Western countries, with a depth of penetration and breadth of scope far exceeding Western countries' imagination. Due to the war with Nazi Germany, Western countries granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union and subsequently regarded it as an "ally." Consequently, the Soviet Union was finally able to "legally" establish embassies in Western countries, dispatch diplomatic personnel, and thereby connect its "intelligence network" in the West into a cohesive whole using the embassies as nodes.

After the incident, British intelligence agencies displayed extremely high enthusiasm and initiative regarding the "Gouzenko Affair." MI6 and MI5 directly contacted Gouzenko at the first opportunity. The first British intelligence officer to meet Gouzenko face-to-face was William Stephenson from MI6. At the time, Stephenson was in charge of the "British Security Coordination" office established by MI6 in New York City, safeguarding the security interests of the British Empire in the Americas and cooperating with the US Office of Strategic Services. After the "Gouzenko Affair" occurred, Stephenson was sent to Canada as a representative of Western allied intelligence agencies. Shortly after his arrival, Roger Hollis, an MI5 agent responsible for monitoring the Communist Party, also joined the meeting with Gouzenko.

In October 1945, Roger Hollis, representing British intelligence agencies, drafted a report for British Prime Minister Attlee, proposing three options for consideration: 1. Maintain strict secrecy and monitor the spy network disclosed by Gouzenko; 2. Expose the spies and expel Soviet diplomats, a simple and direct approach, but the Soviet side might treat it as a diplomatic incident; 3. Deliberately leak the information to the media, allowing it to evolve into major international news, after which the Soviet side would certainly lodge diplomatic protests, at which point the "evidence" disclosed by Gouzenko could be brought out to thoroughly expose the matter in the arena of international public opinion. British intelligence agencies all leaned towards the third option,

They also insisted that "handling the matter quietly" was simply impossible. In their view, since the "moles" held key positions, it was clearly impossible not to take action. However, investigating, arresting, or even prosecuting these hidden "moles" would inevitably become known to the outside world. Ultimately, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, persuaded Attlee to finally adopt the recommendations of the intelligence and security services. In fact, as early as 1943, Churchill had already tasked Attlee with overseeing wartime intelligence management. Therefore, he was no stranger to the work of MI5 and MI6, and was perhaps one of the British Prime Ministers closest to the intelligence services after Churchill. During the handling of the "Gouzenko Affair," British intelligence agencies largely bypassed the Canadian government, issuing orders directly to their Canadian counterparts.

Beyond Britain's own national security considerations, both Churchill and Attlee viewed the "Gouzenko Affair" from the perspective of Anglo-American relations and the strategic landscape among Western allies. Just after the end of World War II, compared to Britain, which was rapidly adjusting its attitude toward the Soviet Union, the United States, particularly public opinion, still lingered in the phase of viewing the USSR as a "wartime ally." What worried Britain even more was that the United States seemed to have no intention of maintaining a long-term political and military presence in Europe. The most obvious example was Roosevelt's statement to Stalin at the Yalta Conference that the US military planned to withdraw completely from Europe within two years after the war. Truman, who unexpectedly entered the White House, had been an obscure senator when the war broke out and lacked extensive experience in international diplomacy. Facing direct pressure from the Soviet Union in Europe, Britain urgently needed to guide the United States to readjust its European policy and attitude toward the Soviet Union as soon as possible.

As Melvyn Leffler described, the US government, influenced by a series of events including the "Gouzenko Affair" from late 1945 to early 1946, began to gradually view the Soviet Union as an "enemy." From the American perspective, this simplified "black-and-white" approach allowed them to shift all responsibility for the nation's predicaments onto Moscow. For Truman, who had no experience in handling international issues, this approach perfectly suited his tastes. After the "Gouzenko Affair," the British, who were operating behind the scenes, precisely recognized this.

How to use the political imagination of the "special Anglo-American relationship" to influence the United States became, at that time,

the most urgent task in the minds of the British. The "Gouzenko Affair" provided a perfect opportunity. Before the outbreak of World War II, British diplomatic and intelligence agencies had experience using American media to influence public opinion in support of the war. At this point, they were very hopeful that this intelligence scandal, which occurred in Canada and exposed the Soviet spy network in North America, could cover up Britain's security lapses, while simultaneously making Americans recognize the serious threat the Soviet Union posed to the Western world. They aimed to transform this embarrassing scandal into a "cautionary lesson" for Western society, especially American society, thereby further strengthening Anglo-American relations during the turbulent postwar years.

On September 30, 1945, under the "strong recommendation" of the British side, Mackenzie King gave Truman his first detailed briefing on the course of the "Gouzenko Affair" and the contents of the related documents. Shortly thereafter, Truman learned from counterintelligence agencies that Assistant Secretary of State Alger Hiss was also allegedly a "Soviet spy." This series of events began to make Truman realize the "severity" of Soviet infiltration into the Western camp. In late October, the FBI considered launching arrests in the United States based on the documents disclosed by Gouzenko, but ultimately had to postpone them due to a lack of direct evidence usable for prosecution. Mackenzie King, however, was unwilling to take action alone, not wanting to "come into direct conflict with the Russians alone, without the Americans taking similar action." At the end of December 1945, several British and American newspapers published reports that the FBI was investigating Soviet spies stealing American jet engine technology. This made King very alert, fearing that Britain and the United States might force the Canadian government to take tough measures quickly by "leaking" information to the press. In fact, the British did indeed have this intention.

In January 1946, the British side began to continuously pressure Canada. On February 4, Mackenzie King finally agreed to establish a special commission of inquiry to detain and interrogate suspects involved in the case. On the fifth, Mackenzie King informed the entire cabinet about the "Gouzenko Affair." Ten days later, the first batch of twelve people were arrested, eventually leading to the arrest of nearly forty people, including Americans, Canadians, and Britons; among them were members of parliament, government officials, and scientists involved in the "Manhattan Project." Meanwhile, American columnist Drew Pearson was the first to disclose the matter in the media, and Pearson's source is believed

to have come from Britain. On February 10, Truman hosted former British Prime Minister Churchill at the White House. Churchill spent several hours explaining to Truman the main content of the speech he was about to deliver at Westminster College in Fulton, "warning the world to be vigilant against Soviet intentions and calling for Anglo-American military cooperation." In Leffler's view, Churchill's "eloquence" clearly moved Truman, and episodes like the "Gouzenko Affair" undoubtedly became the best "examples" for Churchill to persuade the American government and public. The book A Preponderance of Power also quoted a line from the diary of a White House aide: after a long conversation with Churchill, "President Truman was very eager to make American policy tougher." On February 22, George Kennan sent that equally famous "Long Telegram" from Moscow, the content of which echoed Churchill's remarks at the White House.

On March 5, 1946, Churchill, after much deliberation, finally delivered his famous "Iron Curtain Speech" at Westminster College in Fulton, United States. Besides elaborately describing the Soviet Union's unabashed expansion of its sphere of influence, Churchill specifically mentioned the dangers hidden within Western countries: "In many countries far from the Russian borders, spread across the world, Communist fifth columns have been established, obeying directives from the Communist center and cooperating with each other... The Communist Party or the fifth column has constituted an increasingly serious challenge and threat to Christian civilization." Returning to the context of the time, Churchill's words had a very clear target.

However, even after the "Gouzenko Affair" was exposed, public opinion in the United States and Canada did not overnight shift toward a fully anti-Soviet narrative. After the first interim report of the Canadian Special Committee was made public, The New York Times pointed out: "Most of the information leaked by this intelligence network to the Soviet Union could have been obtained through the military liaison systems between countries during the war." In other words, the classification level of the leaked intelligence was not high, and it was often information that might have been exchanged between allies during wartime. Furthermore, according to the committee's interrogations, it was found that most of the "Soviet spies" were believers in communist or socialist ideals, and most did not consider revealing information to the Soviet Union, an "ally" during the war, to be "treason." In June 1946, the Special Committee released another Blue Book, stating that the reason for such large-scale espionage activities was that a considerable number of people had developed a "misguided sympathy" for communism and the Communist Party.

In the view of Churchill and Attlee, the focus of the investigation into the "Gouzenko Affair" was not on the importance of the leaked intelligence, but rather on reinforcing the image of the Soviet Union as an enemy in public opinion, creating a political atmosphere of binary opposition, and turning Western countries, especially the United States, toward viewing the Soviet Union as a new enemy. Gouzenko himself even briefly became a "media star," wearing a hood or mask, frequently giving interviews and even appearing on television programs, personally revealing to Western democracies the pervasive and terrifying nature of the Soviet spy organization. In 1948, 20th Century Fox even produced the film The Iron Curtain, based on the "Gouzenko Affair," which made the affair more deeply ingrained in the Western consciousness, becoming "proof" of the threat posed by Soviet power to the West.

First, from the perspective of Cold War history, the "Gouzenko Affair" had a profound social impact in Western countries, almost completely erasing the goodwill and trust toward the Soviet Union that Western publics had accumulated during World War II. It also effectively suppressed the political activities of leftist groups in various countries and served as a public opinion "warm-up" for the beginning of the Cold War. Public perception of the Soviet Union in Europe and America deteriorated rapidly, wartime support for the Soviet Union vanished, and overall political tendencies shifted sharply to the right. From the perspective of international relations, "insecurity" has always been the primary driving force behind various strategies and policies. Once the foundation of mutual trust between the two sides collapses, they will infinitely amplify each other's threats. In the preface to A Preponderance of Power, Leffler cautioned: "(Great powers) should carefully consider how to manage the fears between them, while also considering how to regulate their pride in the growth of their own power or their anxiety over its decline."

The "Kennan Telegram" and the "Iron Curtain Speech" essentially denied any legitimacy to Soviet policy, instead portraying the Soviet Union's concerns and insecurities regarding its own national security as "something irrational." The "Gouzenko Affair" became the best "footnote" to this series of perceptions. These events effectively shook and dismantled the goodwill and trust toward the Soviet Union that the Western camp had accumulated during World War II, subsequently viewing it as "misguided sympathy." The ensuing "McCarthyism" was merely an inevitable product on this "extension line."

In the 1946 U.S. midterm elections, the Republicans won a significant victory in Congress for the first time in ten years, with one important background being the political atmosphere of vigilance against so-called "Soviet spies." The Republicans'...

...one of the biggest attacks on the Truman administration was its failure to effectively handle the infiltration of Soviet influence within the United States. The entire political climate in Washington changed abruptly, and Hoover's FBI began to publicly accuse the federal government of still harboring so-called "communists." In the spring of 1947, Attlee also established the "Committee on Subversive Activities" in Britain and personally organized so-called "counter-espionage cooperation" between Britain and the Commonwealth nations.

Compared to the dramatic shifts in the Western camp, Moscow's foreign policy at the time appeared more stable. Setting aside its domestic policies, Soviet foreign policy under Stalin was more akin to opportunism, "valuing ideology but being very pragmatic." Leffler frankly pointed out: "Neither Stalin's speeches nor his actions were as threatening as some U.S. government officials believed." He believed that establishing understanding or easing relations with the United States did not contradict the Soviet Union's national interests. If observed from a longer historical perspective, it is not difficult to see that this was actually the inherent pattern of Stalin's long-standing foreign policy. Since the Soviet Union faced various direct external threats from its inception, what Stalin pursued in the diplomatic sphere was a sense of "security," often achieved through aggressive forms such as outward expansion. However, behind the strong stance and ideological confrontation, considerations based on realism were always the underlying tone of Stalin's diplomatic decisions. For example, he could abandon the Chinese Eastern Railway after Japan occupied Northeast China to seek temporary calm in the Soviet Far East, and he could also vigorously aid China in resisting Japanese aggression after 1937; he could discuss the "possibility of collective security" with Western countries in the 1930s, and then turn to sign a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Even after the Cold War began, whether in the "Berlin Crisis" or the "Iran Crisis," behind Stalin's seemingly bellicose actions lay a cautious realist psychology. If one re-examines Leffler's description of the "genesis of the Cold War" from this angle, one might understand the significance of his pluralistic explanation of the origins of the Cold War.

On December 21, 1946, Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of President Roosevelt, had a meeting with Stalin. During the meeting, Eleanor raised two questions: First, was it possible for a democratic country like the United States to coexist peacefully with a communist country like the Soviet Union, without either side attempting to interfere in the other's internal political affairs; Second,...

...did the recently concluded U.S. midterm elections mean that the American people had abandoned "Rooseveltism." Stalin's answers to both questions were very direct. First, he believed that peaceful coexistence between the two sides was "not only possible, but reasonable and entirely feasible"; second, he criticized the current Truman administration for "wasting the moral and political legacy left by President Roosevelt, which is why the Republicans won a landslide victory in the midterm elections."

At the end of the meeting, Stalin left one remark regarding the sharp deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations: "Now no one knows what they are fighting for. Therefore, I do not think it is terrible that some people in the U.S. government talk about the deterioration of relations between our two countries. But I also believe that the threat of a new war is unrealistic."

(A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, by Melvyn P. Leffler, translated by Sun Jianzhong, Commercial Press, 2019 edition)